Cloud storage is a new computing paradigm that allows users to store their data in the cloud and access them anytime anywhere through the Internet. To address the various security issues that may arise in the cloud storage accessed by a large number of users, cryptographic encryption should be considered. Currently, researches on revocable attribute-based encryption (RABE) systems, which provide user revocation function and ciphertext update function by extending attribute-based encryption (ABE) systems that provide access control to ciphertexts, are actively being studied. Recently, Xu et al. proposed new RABE scheme that combines ABE and identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes to efficiently handle ciphertext update and user revocation functionality. In this paper, we show that there is a serious security problem in Xu et al.'s RABE scheme such that a semi-trusted cloud storage can decrypt a ciphertext by colluding with a revoked user. Therefore, the RABE scheme of Xu et al. is not able to provide meaningful security in cloud storage.
Introduction
Cloud storage is a computing paradigm that stores data in a centralized cloud and allows users to access these data anytime anywhere on the Internet using simple client devices. The main advantages of cloud storage include flexible accessibility, ease management, and cost savings. Despite these advantages, cloud storage is inevitably experiencing a variety of security issues because it stores data in an external cloud storage that is outside of the control of the data owner. The key reason that the cloud storage security issue differs from the existing computer server security issue is that the cloud storage is not fully trusted so that the internal administrators of the cloud storage can access the data and leak the information [3] .
The easiest way to keep users data secure in cloud storage is to encrypt the data and store it in the cloud. In this case, in order to share the encrypted data with many users, it is needed to effectively control access to the encrypted data according to the authority of the dynamically changing user. That is, the cloud storage needs to revoke some users whose credentials are no longer valid so that revoked users can not access data. In addition, the cloud storage should be able to prevent previously revoked users to gain access to encrypted data that were created long ago by using their old private keys after colluding with internal administrators.
To solve these problems in cloud storage, we can use attribute-based encryption (ABE), which provides access control to ciphertexts. Boldyreva et al. [1] proposed a revocable ABE (RABE) scheme that extends the ABE scheme by providing the ability to revoke a user's private key. Sahai et al. [4] proposed a revocablestorage ABE (RS-ABE) scheme by extending the concept of RABE that provides the ciphertext update functionality to prevent previously revoked users from accessing previously created ciphertexts in cloud storage. After that, Lee et al. [2] proposed efficient RS-ABE schemes that can update ciphertexts more efficiently by combining a self-updatable encryption (SUE) scheme and an ABE scheme. Therefore, RS-ABE schemes, which provide user revocation and ciphertext update, can be a solution to the problem of cloud storage described above. Recently, Xu et al. [5] proposed an RABE scheme that combines an ABE scheme with an IBE scheme by introducing new time encoding functions to efficiently support ciphertext update than the existing RS-ABE schemes. Compared with the most efficient RS-ABE scheme of Lee et al., the RABE scheme of Xu et al. is more efficient in terms of ciphertext size and update key size.
In this paper, we show that it is possible to break the security of the RABE scheme of Xu et al. [5] . A key feature of cloud storage is that the cloud storage is not fully trusted. In other words, the cloud storage faithfully performs the tasks requested by the user, but is curious about the information of the users' data. Thus cloud storage should also be considered as a honest-but-curious attacker. However, Xu et al. have overlooked that cloud storage can be an attacker. Suppose that the cloud storage is an attacker. Then the cloud storage first converts the original ciphertext associated with current time of Xu et al.'s RABE scheme stored in the cloud storage to another ciphertext associated with past time. Next, the cloud storage colludes with a revoked user who has an old private key corresponding to the policy of the original ciphertext. Then it can sufficiently decrypt the modified ciphertext with the past time by using the revoked private key. Therefore, the RABE scheme of Xu et al. is not a secure scheme since the cloud storage is not fully trusted.
The organization of this paper is as follows: In Section 2, we first review the RABE scheme of Xu et al. and their security model. Then, in Section 3, we discuss our ciphertext outdate attack how to the RABE scheme of Xu et al. by exploiting the time encoding functions proposed by Xu et al. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 4.
Xu et al.'s Revocable Attribute-Based Encryption
In this section, we review the RABE scheme of Xu et al. [5] and the security model of their RABE.
Construction
Before explaining the RABE scheme of Xu et al. [5] , we first define the time encoding functions proposed by them. The TEncode function converts a time period t to a bit string bt of log 2 T length by appending zero value to the prefix of the bit string. The CTEncode function converts a time period t to an encoded bit string et by finding the first zero value and then converts all remaining values to zero. The definitions of these two time encoding functions are described follows:
TEncode(t, T ): It takes a decimal number t. It encodes t to a bit string bt. While |bt| < log 2 T , it performs bt = 0 bt. It returns the bit string bt. As an example, let us look at the encoding results for two time periods t = 5 and t * = 7 when the maximum time is T = 2 5 . Since T = 2 5 , the function TEncode(t = 5, T ) returns a bit string bt = 00101, the function TEncode(t * = 7, T ) returns a bit string bt * = 00111, and the function CTEncode(t * = 7, T ) returns the bit string et * = 00000.
The RABE scheme of Xu et al. follows the existing design methodology of previous RABE schemes that combines an ABE scheme, a tree-based broadcast scheme, and an IBE scheme in bilinear groups. In addition, Xu et al. have changed the structure of ciphertext to provide ciphertext update functionality by devising a new ciphertext encoding method. To use a tree-based broadcast scheme, two additional functions Path and KUNodes should be defined. The function Path returns a set of nodes in a binary tree that are in the path from the root node to the specified leaf node, and the function KUNodes returns a set of nodes that are root nodes of sub-trees where the leaf nodes of all sub-trees can cover the set of all non-revoked leaf nodes in the binary tree. For a more detailed definition of these functions, see the work of Boldyreva et al. [1] . The RABE scheme of Xu et al. is described as follows:
Let λ be the security parameter, N be the maximum number of users, T be the bounded system life time, and n be the maximum number of attributes. It obtains a bilinear group (p, G, G T , e) by running G(1 λ ) where p is prime order of the groups. Let g be a generator of G. It selects a random exponent α and sets g 1 = g α . It also chooses random elements g 2 ,
where
It sets a binary tree BT with at least N number of leaves. Finally, it outputs a revocation list RL = / 0, a state ST = BT , a master key MK = α, and public parameters
GenKey(id, A, MK, ST, PP): Let id be an identity and A = (M, ρ) be an access policy for attributes where M is a d × ℓ matrix. It assigns the user identity id to a leaf node θ ∈ BT . For each node x ∈ Path(θ ), it performs the following steps: 1) It fetches α x from the node x. If α x is not defined before, then it chooses a random α x ∈ Z p and stores it in the node x. 2) Let u be a random ℓ dimensional vector over Z p such that 1 · u = α x . For each row i in the matrix M, it chooses a random exponent r i and sets a partial private key PSK id,x = {K i,0 = g
. Finally, it outputs a private key SK id = {PSK id,x } x∈Path(θ ) and an updated state ST = BT . UpdateKey(t, RL, MK, ST, PP): Let t be a revocation epoch and RL be the revocation list. It obtains a bit string bt by running TEncode(t, T ). Let V bt be the set of all i for which bt[i] = 0. For each node x ∈ KUNodes(BT, RL,t), it performs the following steps: 1) It fetches α x from the node x. If α x is not defined before, then it chooses a random α x ∈ Z p and stores it in the node x.
2) It chooses a random exponent r and obtains a partial key update PKU t,
Finally, it outputs a key update KU t = {PU K t,x } x∈KUNodes(BT,RL,t) .
DeriveDK(SK id , KU t , PP): Let SK id = ({PSK id,x } x∈Path(θ ) ) and KU t = ({PKU t,x } x∈KUNodes(BT,RL,t) ). If Path(θ )∩KUNodes(BT, RL,t) = / 0, then it outputs ⊥. Otherwise, it finds a unique node x ∈ Path(θ )∩ KUNodes(BT, RL,t) and retrieves PSK id,x and PKU t,x for the node x from SK id and KU t respectively. Finally it outputs a decryption key DK id,t = {PSK id,x , PKU t,x } .
Encrypt(S,t, m, PP): Let S be an attribute set, t be time, and m be a message. It obtains an encoded string et by running CTEncode(t, T ). Let V et be the set of all i for which et[i] = 0. It chooses a random exponent s ∈ Z p and outputs an original ciphertext
UpdateCT(CT t ,t ′ , PP): Let CT t = (C,C 1 , {C 2,i }, E 1 , {E 2, j } j∈V et ) be an original ciphertext for time t and t ′ be update time such that t ≤ t ′ . If t ′ < t, then it returns ⊥ to indicate that the time t ′ is invalid.
Otherwise, it obtains a bit string bt by running TEncode(t, T ). It chooses a random exponent s ′ ∈ Z p for randomization and outputs an updated ciphertext
Decrypt(CT t , DK id,t , PP): Let CT t = (C,C 1 , {C 2,i }, E t ) be an update ciphertext for time t and DK id,t = (PSK id,x , PKU t,x ) be a decryption key where PSK id,x = ({K i,0 , K i,1 } i∈ [d] ) and PKU t,x = (U 0 ,U 1 ). It computes a first component A 1 = ∏ ρ(i)∈S (e(C 1 , K i,0 )/e(C i,0 , K i,1 )) w i . Next, it computes a second component A 2 = e(C 1 ,U 0 )/e(E t ,U 1 ). It outputs a decrypted message m by computing C/(A 1 · A 2 ).
Revoke(id,t, RL, ST ): Let id be an identity and t be revocation time. It adds (id,t) to RL and returns the updated revocation list RL.
Security Model
We describe the security model of the RABE scheme as defined by Xu et al. [5] . This security model is almost similar to the security model used in the existing RABE and RS-ABE schemes except that the leakage of decryption keys is not considered [1, 2, 4] . The selective IND-RABE-CPA security is defined as the following game between a challenger C and an adversary A:
Init: A first submits a challenge attribute set S * . Setup: C generates an empty revocation list rl, a state ST , a master key MK, and public parameters PP by running the setup algorithm Setup(λ , N , T , n), and then it gives PP to A. Phase 1: A may adaptively request private key, key update, and revocation queries to the following oracles.
• The private key generation oracle takes an identity id and an access structure A as input, and returns a private key SK id by running GenKey(id, A, MK, ST, PP).
• The key update oracle takes time t as input, and returns a key update KU t by running UpdateKey(t, RL, MK, ST, PP).
• The revocation oracle takes a revoked identity id and time t as input, and updates the revocation list by running Revoke(id,t, RL, ST ).
Challenge: A submits challenge time t * ∈ T and two challenge messages m * 0 , m * 1 of the same size with the following constraints:
• If a private key for an identity id and an access structure A such that A(S * ) = 1 was queried to the private key generation oracle, then the revocation of the identity id must be queried on time t such that t ≤ t * to the revocation oracle.
• If a non-revoked user with the identity id whose access structure A satisfies the challenge attribute set S * , then id should not be previously queried to the private key generation oracle.
C flips a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and creates a challenge ciphertext CT * by running Encrypt(S * ,t * , m * b , PP). It gives CT * and to A. 
Ciphertext Outdate Attack
In this section, we show that there is an effective adversary against the RABE scheme of Xu et al. [5] . To do this, we first analyze the properties of two time encoding functions, TEncode and CTEncode, proposed by Xu et al. through the following two lemmas. The key to the following two lemmas is that a challenge original ciphertext associated with challenge time t * can be changed to a ciphertext element associated with the past time t.
Lemma 3.1. Let st be a bit string in {0, 1} log 2 T and V st be the set of all i such that st[i] = 0. There exist time periods t,t * ∈ T such that t < t * and V bt ⊆ V et * where bt is obtained from TEncode(t, T ) and et * is obtained from CTEncode(t * , T ).
Proof. For the notational simplicity, we set T = 2 τ . To prove this lemma, we first randomly choose time periods t,t * satisfying 0 < t < t * < 2 τ−1 . Then, we run TEncode(t, T ) to get a bit string bt ∈ {0, 1} τ and TEncode(t * , T ) to get another bit string bt * ∈ {0, 1} τ . Since the time periods t and t * are smaller than 2 τ−1 , the first bit value bt [1] and bt * [1] of the two bit strings bt and bt * have the same bit 0. Now let 's analyze the bit string et * obtained by running CTEncode(t * , T ). In the CTEncode algorithm, the algorithm finds the first position with a bit value of 0 in the bt * bit string and then sets all subsequent bit values to a value of zero. Thus, the resulting bit string et * becomes a bit string with 0 value in all positions since bt * [1] = 0 is already fixed. Therefore, the set V et * consists of {1, 2, . . . , τ} and the set of V bt should be a subset of {1, 2, . . . , τ} since 0 < t. Lemma 3.2. If there exist time periods t,t * ∈ T such that t < t * and V bt ⊆ V et * where bt is obtained from TEncode(t, T ) and et * is obtained from CTEncode(t * , T ), then a ciphertext element E t for time t can be derived from an original ciphertext CT * for time t * .
Proof. As the same as in Lemma 3.1, we randomly choose time periods t and t * to satisfy 0 < t < t * < 2 τ−1 .
In the RABE scheme of Xu et al., the original ciphertext CT * for the time t * includes ciphertext elements E 1 and E 2, j for all j ∈ V et * . As shown in the previous Lemma 3.1, the set V et * is defined as a set of all indices from 1 to τ since all bit values of et * are composed of 0. In the description of the UpdateCT algorithm, the ciphertext element E t can be derived by composing the elements E 1 and E 2, j for all j ∈ V bt of CT * . Therefore, it is possible to construct the element E t since V bt ⊆ V et * is satisfied by Lemma 3.1.
We use the previous two lemmas to show that cloud storage which stores original ciphertexts that are created by users can change an original ciphertext into a past ciphertext to obtain a message by colluding with a revoked user who has a private key. Proof. The basic idea of our attack is for an adversary to change the original challenge ciphertext CT * of time t * to another outdated ciphertext CT t of the past time t such that t < t * . If the adversary has queried a private key SK id for an identity id on an access policy A satisfying the challenge attribute S * of the challenge ciphertext, then the adversary can derive a decryption key DK id,t by combining the private key SK id with the key update key KU t of the past time t since the identity id is not revoked at the past time t. Thus, the adversary can decrypt the outdated ciphertext CT t by using DK id,t .
A detailed adversary algorithm A breaking the RABE scheme of Xu et al. is described as follows:
1. First, A sets past time t and challenge time t * that satisfies the condition described in Lemma 3.1. Next, it submits a challenge attribute set S * and receives the public parameter PP of the RABE scheme.
2.
A selects an access policy A satisfying the challenge attribute set S * and obtains a private key SK id by requesting a private key on an identity id and the access policy A. After that, A requests a key update on the past time t and obtain a key update KU t . Because the identity id has not yet been revoked on the time t, A can derive a decryption key DK id,t from SK id and KU t .
3. Now, A requests the revocation of the identity id on the challenge time t * since the private key SK id that satisfies the challenge attribute set S * should be revoked on the challenge time t * by the definition of the RABE security model. Note that A can not derive a decryption key DK id,t * for the challenge time t * because the identity id is already revoked on the time t * .
4. At the challenge step, A submits the challenge time t * , and randomly selected challenge messages m * 0 , m * 1 and obtains a challenge original ciphertext CT * . Note that the previous private key, key update, and revocation queries of A satisfy all the constraints of the RABE security model since the private key satisfying A(S * ) = 1 was revoked on the challenge time t * .
5. Let CT * = (C,C 1 , {C 2,i }, E 1 , {E 2, j } j∈V et * ) be the original ciphertext on the time t * where et * is obtained from CTEncode(t * , T ). Consider the set V bt for the fixed past time t. The ciphertext element E t can be derived from the original ciphertext CT * by Lemma 3.2 because V bt ⊆ V et * is satisfied. Therefore, it is possible for A to construct an outdated ciphertext CT t = (C,C 1 ,C 2,i , E t ) associated with the challenge attribute S * and the past time t by performing re-randomization.
6. Finally, A obtains the message m * by decrypting CT t using DK id,t and outputs a bit b ′ by comparing m * with the challenge messages. Now we analyze the success probability of the adversary A described above. As shown above, the decryption succeeds because all the queries of A satisfy the constraints of the security model and the outdated ciphertext is also a valid ciphertext with the correct distribution. Therefore, A wins the RABE security game since the advantage of A is 1/2.
Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that it is possible for cloud storage to perform the ciphertext outdate attack for the RABE scheme proposed by Xu et al. This attack was possible because the cloud storage is not a fully trusted entity and it could modify the original ciphertext stored by the users to another ciphertext corresponding to the past time. Although Xu et al. correctly modeled the cloud storage itself as an attacker in the security model of their RABE scheme, they didn't consider the cloud storage as an attacker in the security proof since the attacker can not obtain the original ciphertext and obtain only the updated ciphertext from the original ciphertext. Therefore, the RABE scheme of Xu et al. can be secure for outside attackers like malicious users but it can not be secure for inside attackers like malicious administrators of cloud storage.
